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exceptions have been made by a few courts to allow the substantive statute
of limitations to be suspended. In Frabutt v.New York, Chicago, and
St. Louis Railway, 6 the statute of limitations was suspended in an action
between citizens of countries at war. Once more the dictum supported
the general rule, but an exception was made, allowing the action to be
brought, because of the facts of the case. In Scarborough v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad," plaintiff delayed filing suit upon defendant's assurance that he would lose none of his rights under the FELA. Defendant
was later estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. Pointing
out that there "is no inherent magic in these words (substantive and
remedial) ,,"8 the court refused to accept the idea that there should be any
difference between the two types of limitations in respect to the application of estoppel.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court refused to follow the rule that
substantive statutes of limitation cannot be defeated by estoppel. Apparently, this rule is now dead, at least with regard to cases under the
FELA. The Court felt that the equitable maxim that "no man may
take advantage of his own wrong" was of greater importance than any
fine technical distinction between types of limitations. The Supreme
Court felt that the spirit and not the letter of the law should control.
The Court also felt it was clear that Congress did not intend for employers to avoid liability by delaying tactics such as alleged by plaintiff."0
The Supreme Court has thus destroyed what has been justly called a
legalistic and narrow distinction." The decision in the Glus case is in
keeping with the principle that "statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention and if possible,
so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion."'" The Court has taken
a laudable step toward allowing the FELA to operate unhindered by fine
legal distinctions.
R.EESE TAYLOR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

LIQUOR CONTROL FEET OF A CHURCH

PERMITS WITHIN 500

A restaurant applied to the Ohio Department of Liquor Control for
a D-5 permit to sell beer and any intoxicating liquor at its place of business. The First Church of the Nazarene stood on a site three hundred
and twenty-five feet from the restaurant and, pursuant to the provision
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

84 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Pa. 1949).
178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
Id. at 259.
359 U.S. at 234.
Maryland, to Use of Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1891).
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of section 4303.26 of the Ohio Revised Code, was notified of the permit
application. The objections made by the church to the permit application were based primarily on moral convictions against consuming intoxicating liquors and a fear of depredation of the value of the church
property if a permit were issued. The Director of Liquor Control finding
these objections to be well-founded refused to issue the permit.
An appeal was taken to the Board of Liquor Control which, by a
divided vote, affirmed the order of the director. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of Ohio where the judgment was reversed and the
cause remanded to the Director of Liquor Control with instructions to
issue the requested permit.' The court based its decision on the ground
that the objection of the church was "not sufficient, in itself, to provide
the quantum of evidence required to support the denial by the director
of the requested permit."'
The decision in Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control turned on the
questionable interpretation of section 4303.26 of the Ohio Revised Code
which provides in part as follows:
No permit shall be issued by the department if the business speci-

fied in the permit applied for is to be operated within five hundred feet

from the boundaries of a parcel of real estate having situated thereon a
school, church, library, or public playground, until written notice of the
filing of said application with the department has been personally served
upon the authorities in control of said school, church, library, or public
playground and an opportunity provided said authorities for a complete
hearing before the Director of Liquor Control upon the advisability of
the issuance of the said permit....

Prior to this case the supreme court had never been faced with the problem of interpreting this section of the statute. Numerous lower courts
had considered the issue and had held that the fact of a church being
within five hundred feet of a proposed permit location constituted, per se,
substantial and probative evidence to support the denial of a permit 8
In such cases a church was required to do no more than object in order
to prevail. Such an approach was thought to be in accord with sound
public policy.4
However, as a result of the Corwin case, all such thinking and interpretations are cast aside. According to the supreme court:
... a mere objection by the authorities in control of a church, school,
library, or playground within 500 feet of proposed permit premises to

1. Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 304 (1960).
Id. at 310.
3. Currier v. Board of Liquor Control, 150 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Mullins v.
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Board of Liquor Control, 139 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Codic v. Board of Liquor
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